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HOW THE FAMILY FARES: A COMPARISON
OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE AND THE
OHIO PROBATE REFORM ACT
DONALD L. ROBERTSON*
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have responded to
nationwide criticism of probate court costs, delay, and disutility by
promulgating the Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter referred to as
UPC].' Each of its provisions incorporate a probate practice that has
been in effect in one or more jurisdictions for a period of years. Its
most publicized feature is informal administration, a procedure
whereby the probate court's only role-unless interested parties ask
its assistance in formal proceedings-is to record the probate of the
will and appoint a personal representative. The personal representa-
tive, although under stringent duties to account to successors, may
then administer the entire estate as though he had been appointed
trustee of an expertly drafted revocable inter vivos trust. Its intent is
that a highly qualified and responsible attorney may handle even
intestate estates as inexpensively and swiftly as trust companies now
distribute decedents' trust estates. The UPC's most controversial
feature, the surviving spouse's elective share, is part of its provisions
for protecting the family of a decedent from disinheritance and
creditors. The elective share precludes a decedent from disinheriting
the surviving spouse by means of transfers of property during the
decedent's lifetime. The Ohio General Assembly, after three years
* Donald L. Robertson, Principal Attorney, Ohio Legislative Service Commission. This
article is similar to an article, prepared at the request of the UPC Law School Advisory
Council, that will appear in a book entitled "Comparative Probate Law Studies," to be pub-
lished by the American Law Institute. Neither article reflects the view of the Ohio Legislative
Service Commission.
I The author has previously advocated the adoption of the UPC by Mississippi. Robert-
son, The Uniform Probate Code: An Opportunity for Mississippi Lawyers to Better Serve the
Weak and the Grieving, 45 Miss. L.J. 1 (1974). Mississippi's probate practice is in some
respects similar to that of the UPC. Mississippi has a small cohesive bar, which so far has
had no problems with lawyers' plundering estates. The chancery judge has all the supervisory
powers of the old chancellor in equity-more equitable jurisdiction than Ohio law confers upon
a judge of the probate division of the court of common pleas. The Mississippi jurisdiction is
derived from the state constitution, and would not be affected by adoption of the UPC. On
the other hand, recent Ohio Supreme Court rules, and publication of disciplinary proceedings
against probate practitioners, reflect a basis for concern expressed by some UPC opponents
that Ohio lawyers would abuse informal probate administration. The experience in the twelve
states that have adopted the UPC should demonstrate whether the Ohio concern is justified.
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of study, has also adopted a series of probate reforms. 2 In so doing,
Ohio has definitely rejected the UPC, although some of its provisions
and concepts have been adopted into the Ohio probate code.3 This
article compares the UPC's family provisions for the surviving
spouse and children of the decedent with those under Ohio's amended
probate code.
Any detailed comparison is made difficult by the complexity and
volume of the Ohio probate law-complexity and volume intended
by the proponents of the UPC to be replaced by a simple, comprehen-
sive, and functional codification of probate law. The article will first
generally compare the rights of the surviving spouse and children.
It will then discuss in detail the provisions relating to intestate suc-
cession, homestead allowance, and family allowances. Finally, the
UPC's elective share arrangement will be compared with the Ohio
surviving spouse's right to elect to take an intestate share of the
decedent's estate. The conclusion will then summarize other changes
made in Ohio law and suggest factors that could influence the future
trend of the law in this area.
I. GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE AND CHILDREN
A. Under the Uniform Probate Code
Under the UPC, the surviving spouse is entitled to an elective
share of one-third of both probate and nonprobate assets included in
what the UPC defines as the decedent's augmented estate, whether
the decedent dies testate or intestate.' In addition, the surviving
spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance in an amount to be set
by each state,5 exempt property not exceeding $3,500,6 and a reasona-
ble allowance for support during the period of administration of the
2 Am. Sub. S.B. 145, 111 th Ohio General Assembly. The decedent's estate provisions of
the act apply only to the estates of persons who die on or after January 1, 1976. By reason of
his previous advocacy of the adoption of the UPC in Mississippi, the author did not participate
in any way in the drafting of the Ohio act.
3 See, e.g. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2101.24(F), 2105.051, 2101.052, 2105.06, 2105.19.
2107.18, 2107.33, 2107.501, 2107.521, 2107.71, 2109.07, 2113.05, 2113.53, and 2113.54 (Page
Supp. 1975).
' UN FORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201 to -207 (1975 version). The augmented estate includes
certain nonprobate transfers as well as probate assets. Id., § 2-202.
5 Id., § 2-401 (1975 version). The UPC suggests, but does not fix, a figure of $5,000 to be
set by each state as the homestead allowance.
6 Id., § 2-402.
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estate.7 The surviving spouse is not entitled to a dower or curtesy
estate.8
If there is a surviving spouse, the children of the decedent take
no part of the elective share, homestead, or exempt property.' How-
ever, the needs of minor or dependent children are considered in the
determination of the allowance for support, and the guardian or cus-
todian of a child may be paid that part of the allowance allocated to
the child.'0 If neither spouse survives, the children of the decedent
share the exempt property equally." Minor and dependent children
share the homestead allowance."2 However, children whom the dece-
dent was obligated to support, or did in fact support, as well as minor
children, are entitled to the family allowance for support during the
period of administration."
B. The Ohio Law
Under Ohio law, the surviving spouse is entitled to an elective
share of the decedent's "net probate estate" if the decedent dies
testate. He may elect to take "under the will" or "under the law."' 4
Election under the law entitles the surviving spouse to an intestate
share of the net estate, not to exceed one-half.
If the estate is insolvent, the spouse is entitled to a "homestead
exemption from execution."'1 5 However, the Ohio homestead exemp-
tion is not comparable to the Uniform Probate Code's homestead
allowance. The maximum homestead exemption that may be claimed
is $1,000 if the spouse resides on the land, but only $500 if the land
must be sold to pay prior liens.'"
Formerly Ohio law included provisions for exempt property and
an allowance for support comparable to those of the UPC. However,
the 1975 amendments repealed the requirement that appraisers set
7 Id., §§ 2-403, 2-404. The allowance is limited to one year if the estate is insolvent. The
personal representative may fix the allowance at any sum up to $6,000 per year, although the
court has power to increase or decrease the amount.
Id., § 2-113.
Id., §§ 2-401 to 2-403.
" Id., § 2-403.
Id., § 2-402.
22 Id., § 2-401.
" Id., § 2403.
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2127.26, 2329.75 (Page 1968).
's Id., § 2127.26.
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aside a certain amount of personal property as exempt from adminis-
tration, t7 and that they fix an allowance sufficient to support the
surviving spouse and minor children for one year. 8
Ohio has replaced these provisions with a lump sum family al-
lowance," and has granted the surviving spouse the right to take one
automobile of the decedent." The family allowance is in the amount
of $5,000-to be paid to the surviving spouse, if any, and if not, to
the minor children of the decedent.2 1
Ohio law has long ago abolished curtesy, 2  but gives a form of
dower interest to both the husband and wife. The surviving spouse is
entitled to an estate for life in one-third of any real property with
respect to which the decedent was "seized as an estate of inheritance
at any time during the marriage," but only to the extent that the
decedent conveyed or encumbered the property during the mar-
riage.23 The dower interest may be released by the spouse, but it is
no longer barred if the spouse leaves and dwells in adultery.24 This
article will not consider the various features of Ohio statutory dower.
It should be noted that it is, however, the only portion of Ohio law
comparable to the UPC inclusion of nonprobate assets in the spouse's
elective share, since the spouse in Ohio is only entitled to dower in
property transferred without the consent of the spouse during the
decedent's lifetime.
In summary, the forced shares of the surviving spouse under the
Ohio Revised Code are a dower interest in nonprobate real property
transferred by the decedent prior to death, an elective share not in
excess of one-half of the net probate estate, a family allowance of
$5,000, and the right to select one automobile of the decedent if he
has not disposed of it by will. 5
Under the UPC, all children, minor or adult, share the exempt
property equally if there is no surviving spouse. Under the Ohio law,
11 125 Ohio Laws 903, 978 (repealed 1976). The appraisers were to set off 20% of the value
of the estate for this purpose, up to $2,500.
" 133 Ohio Laws 185 (repealed 1976).
19 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
20 Id., § 2113.532. This right may be defeated, however, if the spouse has disposed of all
his automobiles by will.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
22 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.09 (Page 1968).
- Id., § 2103.02.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.05 (Page 1968) repealed by Am. Sub. S.B. 195, I I Ith
Ohio General Assembly.
21 The automobile, which is analogous to exempt property, is not part of the assets of the
estate. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.532 (Page Supp. 1975).
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however, adult children are not entitled to any forced share of the
decedent's estate. Thus, if a decedent leaves children over eighteen
years old who are dependent, (e.g., handicapped, or college students)
they will receive nothing except their testate share, if any, or an
intestate share of the estate. Under the UPC, minor and dependent
children are entitled to the homestead allowance if there is no surviv-
ing spouse." Minor and dependent children, and children whom the
decedent was in fact supporting, share in the family allowance for
support during the period of administration.2 1 In contrast, under Ohio
law, only minor children are entitled to the family allowance of
$5,000,8 even though a minor child of seventeen might be better able
to support himself than a disabled dependent child over eighteen.
II. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
In order to compare the UPC elective share of the augmented
estate with the Ohio election to take under the law, it is necessary to
understand the manner in which each deals with intestate succession.
The recent Ohio amendments accept the UPC concept that the sur-
viving spouse should take the entire amount of a small estate. Ohio
has, in fact, borrowed UPC language giving the spouse "the first
thirty thousand dollars" of the estate." UPC § 2-101 provides that
any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by his will
passes to his heirs under the UPC, rather than referring as Ohio does
to the estate of a person who dies "intestate." 30
A. Surviving Spouse as Sole Heir
Both the UPC 31 and Ohio law3" provide that the surviving
spouse is entitled to the entire estate if the decedent leaves no surviv-
ing child or parent.
2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (1975 version).
Id., § 2-403.
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
29 Id., § 2105.06(B), (C); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1975 version). Some Ohio title
lawyers profess discomfort over the meaning of "the first thirty thousand dollars," particularly
in estates that contain no "dollars," but only securities, land, and other property. They seem
unwilling to believe that the language simply entitles the spouse to the first thirty thousand
dollars of value in the estate, even if children or parents of the decedent also survive.
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page Supp. 1975). As late as 1967, an Ohio court
had to inform the bar that a person may be said to die intestate as to that part of his property
which he does not dispose of by his will. Central National Bank v. McMunn, 12 Ohio Misc. I,
228 N.E.2d 349 (P. Ct. 1967).
21 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(l) (1975 version).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(D) (Page Supp. 1975).
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 321 (1976)
B. Surviving Spouse and Parents
Ohio law, in contrast to the UPC, gives no interest to a parent
of the decedent if the parent leaves a surviving spouse. The reform
act repealed former Ohio Revised Code § 2105.06(D), which gave the
decedent's parent or parents a one-fourth interest in the entire estate
and the remaining three-fourths to the surviving spouse if no issue of
the decedent survived.
Under the UPC, the parents take an interest only if the estate
exceeds $50,000, with the balance in excess of that passing one-half
to the surviving spouse and one-half to the parent or parents.3 3 The
UPC policy is based upon studies that show that most wills of child-
less persons leave one-half of large estates to their spouses and the
other half to their parents.
In Ohio, the interest of the parents was apparently eliminated
for want of any compelling reasons or studies indicating that the law
should allow parents to share the estate with the spouse.
In any event, the situation seldom arises, and presumably per-
sons with larger estates and dependent parents will generally make
wills.
C. Surviving Spouse and Issue of the Decedent
1. Issue of the Decedent by the Spouse
The UPC gives the surviving spouse the first $50,000 of the
estate, and one-half of the balance of the estate if the decedent is
survived by the spouse and issue of the decedent by the spouse, with
the remainder being divided among the issue.34 The amended Ohio
law follows the principle of the UPC, but reduces the amount given
to the surviving spouse to the first $30,000 of the estate. The divi-
sion of the balance in excess of $30,000 depends upon the number of
children surviving the decedent.36 If the decedent leaves only one
child or the child's issue, the surviving spouse will take one-half of
the balance. However, if the decedent leaves two children, or their
issue, the suriving spouse will only receive one-third of the balance.
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2) (1975 version). In practice, the wisdom of grant-
ing a share to the parents may be dubious. Often they do not need it for their support. It is a
possible source of friction between the parents and the spouse. In some cases the spouse may
even be forced to sell the home to pay the parents' share.
34 Id., § 2-102(3).
' OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(B), (C) (Page Supp. 1975).
30 Id.
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This not only reflects a policy decision to provide a greater share of
the estate to the children, but also implies a belief that most decedents
who leave estates in excess of $30,000 would be more fearful that their
spouses would not preserve the estate for their children than that
guardianship expense would unnecessarily waste assets that the dece-
dent would have preferred go to his wife and familyY
2. Issue of the Decedent Not by the Spouse
The UPC gives the first $50,000 of the estate only to a surviving
spouse who is the parent of all the decedent's surviving issue .1 The
new Ohio law, on the other hand, gives the first $10,000 of the estate
to a surviving spouse who is not the parent of all of the decedent's
surviving issue.39 Ohio divides the excess of the estate over $10,000
in the same manner as if all of the issue were the children of the
decedent and the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse takes one-
half of the balance if there is one surviving child, or its issue, and one-
third if there are two or more children, or their issue.
3. Payment of the Specific Monetary Amount
Ohio law now requires the specific monetary share of the surviv-
ing spouse to be paid first out of tangible and intangible personal
property, valued at its appraised value. 391- If this property is not
sufficient to pay the $30,000 or $10,000 to which the spouse is entitled,
the balance is charged as a non-interest lien on real estate.3 1-2
Where the estate's assets fluctuate in value, the value of the marital
deduction as of the date of death may be at least partly unascertain-
able as a result of this requirement of distribution in kind at appraised
values. 9 -" The value on the date of distribution may prove to be
3 This section, along with several other sections of the new Ohio law, arguably reflects a
distrust of lawyers. Under the unsupervised administration procedures of the UPC, the distribu-
tion to the spouse would be accomplished quickly, and there would be no record from which it
could be publicly determined that children did not receive their share. Even under the Ohio
system, which does provide such a record, some probate judges are now urging that Ohio courts
be given affirmative investigatory powers to prevent the victimization of estates and heirs. They
believe Ohio lawyers would abuse unsupervised administration. Impartial studies of the experi-
ence of jurisdictions where unsupervised administration exists, which might confirm or deny
this suspicion, do not yet exist.
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(4) (1975 version).
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(B), (C) (Page Supp. 1975).
11.1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.063 (Page Supp. 1976).
21 Id.
313 See Minan, A Scrivener's "'Delight"-The Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 92-95 (1976).
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more or less than the specific monetary amount, and result in a
corresponding increase or decrease in the value of the shares passing
to the decedent's issue. A taxable gain or loss may also result.391-
The UPC manifests a preference for, but does not mandate,
distribution in kind.".' It requires that property distributed in kind
be valued at fair market value at the date of distribution when made
to satisfy a homestead or family allowance or a devise payable in
money. 6 However, it does not directly address the question of
valuation in satisfying the specific monetary share of the spouse. The
proponents of the UPC believe that its distribution and administra-
tion provisions, taken together, place the personal representative
under a duty to pay $50,000 in value to the spouse, without any
possibility of the loss of the marital deduction or of a capital gain or
loss to the widow. Distribution in kind of other assets must be propor-
tionate to fluctuations in value of each asset.
It is difficult to even phrase the tax questions that must be
answered with respect to a surviving spouse in Ohio who receives a
non-interest-bearing charge on real estate and elects not to foreclose
the charge. However, the amounts are so small that perhaps certainty
of procedure for distribution outweighs tax complications.
D. Shares of Issue of the Decedent
The Ohio law with respect to inheritance by children of the
deceased is not changed by the new act, apart from the specific mone-
tary share established for the surviving spouse.4" If one child and the
spouse survive the decedent, they share equally in the estate in excess
of the spouse's statutory allotment." Where two or more children
survive in addition to the spouse, the children receive two-thirds of
the excess estate.42 If there is no surviving spouse, the children of the
decedent take the entire estate. 3 If any of the children is deceased,
his issue take per stirpes." If all of the issue of children are in the
. Id. at 91 n.48.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-906.
6 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-906(a)(2).
' Id., § 2105.06(A)-(C).
' Id., § 2105.06(B).
42 Id., 2105.06(C).
43 Id., § 2105.06(A).
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.11 (Page 1968).
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same degree of consanguinity to the decedent, they take in equal
parts, per capita. 4"
Except that the Ohio limit of $30,000 is lower than the $50,000
suggested by the UPC for the surviving spouse, the substance of both
laws is the same." The issue of the decedent take the portion of the
estate not passing to the spouse, or the entire estate if there is no
surviving spouse, in equal shares if they are all of the same degree of
relationship to the decedent. If they are of unequal degree, those of
the more remote degree take by representation, per stirpes.
The other descent and distribution provisions of the Ohio law are
beyond the scope of this paper. Although different in arrangement,
they accomplish the same distribution of property as the UPC, with
one major exception. The UPC cuts off descent and provides for
escheat to the state if there are no grandparents or descendants of
grandparents. The rationale for this is that it avoids the problem of
notifying remote or unknown next of kin when a will is admitted to
probate. Although service of process or waivers are not required for
the admission of a will to probate under the UPC, the UPC require-
ments for actual notification to all interested parties are more strin-
gent than those of Ohio.47
Ohio law, in contrast, permits inheritance by next of kin other
than grandparents or their descendants, but without representation."
Those in the nearest degree of relationship to the decedent, computed
according to the civil law, take the entire estate in equal shares.
Further, Ohio law allows stepchildren to take before property es-
cheats to the state. 49
Ohio law, assuming it satisfies the changing requirements of
procedural due process, deals with the problem of notifying remote
and unknown heirs by requiring proponents of the will to notify only
a spouse and heirs known to be residents of the state."0 A person is
thus treated somewhat like a ship under admiralty law-a "rem"
about whom heirs and devisees should be sufficiently concerned dur-
ing his lifetime so that they will know when he is dead.
45 Id., § 2105.12.
" Arguably, however, the UPC is more readable. See, e.g., § 2-106, dealing with represen-
tation.
'" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-705 (1975 version). Cf. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.13
(Page Supp. 1975).
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(H) (Page Supp. 1975).
I Id., § 2105.06(1).
Id., § 2107.13.
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E. Relationship of Elective Share to Intestate Succession
Under the UPC, a surviving spouse's elective share bears no
relationship to the spouse's intestate share. The elective share is one-
third of the augmented estate, which includes both probate and non-
probate assets. 51 Under the Ohio law, however, the spouse's elective
share is based directly upon the intestate share, but is limited to one-
half of the net probate estate.52
Under both the Ohio law and UPC the estate planner may easily
determine the minimum amount that must be given to the spouse to
discourage an election. However, under the UPC the estate planner
cannot completely defeat the surviving spouse by arranging for all
assets of the decedent to pass at, or before death, by means of inter
vivos transfers, whereas he can in Ohio. 3
III. PROVISIONS FOR THE FAMILY
A. Homestead Allowance
The UPC provides for a homestead allowance to domiciliaries
and suggests the sum of $5,000.11 This allowance passes to the surviv-
ing spouse, if any, or, if none exists, is divided among the minor and
dependent children. It has priority over all claims against the estate.
Although the amount is called a "homestead allowance," no realist
would assert that the amount suggested is sufficient to keep a roof
over the bereaved family unit. The policy behind the homestead al-
lowance is, rather, to fix an amount that may be paid immediately,
thus eliminating probate expense and delay. Coupled with the $3,500
exempt property, and the family allowance during the period of ad-
ministration, it reflects a clear decision to prefer the spouse and
minor or dependent children to creditors, and to expedite the settle-
ment of small estates.
Ohio's homestead exemption normally plays no part in a probate
estate. It is an exemption from execution and so is applicable only
to insolvent estates.5 The exemption applies only to real estate and
is incredibly archaic and complex." Under its terms, if the survivors
" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1975 version).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
" Smyth v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
'* UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (1975 version).
Omro REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.73-.82 (Page 1968).
" Its maximum amount, $1,000, was fixed in 1869.
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entitled to the allowance can live on real estate valued at $1,000, they
may reside on it free of the claims of creditors. Any real estate in
excess of that value must be sold, and the survivors then receive the
generous sum of $500.11
Although Ohio law does not allow the surviving spouse or chil-
dren a significant homestead allowance exemption, it does recognize
that there is merit in allowing the surviving spouse and children to
occupy the family residence for a time, regardless of the decedent's
oversight or malice in failing to make such a provision. Further, the
state recognizes that it is often desirable that the spouse be able to
acquire the family homestead in the spouse's own name rather than
share its ownership with the children.
In common with several other states, the Ohio statutes use the
quaint expression "mansion house" to describe the family home-
stead. For many years, an Ohio statute has given the surviving spouse
the right to remain in the mansion house rent-free for one year. 8 If
the property is sold for the payment of the decedent's debts, the
spouse has the right to be compensated for the rental value of the
unexpired term. 9 The surviving spouse's right to rental comes ahead
of all claims except administration and funeral expenses and shares
priority with the former law's provision for a year's allowance to the
surviving spouse and children. 0
Allowing the surviving spouse to live in the mansion house for
one year allows time to look for a new home and also constitutes a
valuable right for those spouses whose decedents owned property.
There is, however, no corresponding right to reside in leased prem-
ises, nor is there any provision for any amount to be paid to the
spouse whose decedent did not own a mansion house.
No significant litigation or particular probate problems have
arisen with respect to the right to remain in the mansion house. It
has been held that the spouse is not required to reside on the premises
and that a personal representative who collects rents from the prem-
11 Thus a lucky creditor who can show that the property is worth $1,000 plus something
more than de minimis, can obtain a $500 windfall. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.75, 2329.76
(Page 1968).
' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.24 (Page 1968).
59 Id.
Id. Inadvertantly, the statute was not amended to reflect the elimination of the one
year's allowance to the surviving spouse and children, but presumably the courts will still find
an intent that the spouse's right to the reasonable rental value shares priority with the new
provision for a $5,000 family allowance. Am. Sub. S. B. 466, 111th General Assembly, corrects
this error.
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ises must pay them to the surviving spouse.6 The right may not be
computed for the purpose of determining the marital deduction.'"
Ohio also allows a surviving spouse who elects to take against
the will to remain in the mansion house for a year, unless the will
expressly provides otherwise.
Many Ohio lawyers have been vexed by the question of deter-
mining whether and how the surviving spouse gets the house. Some
of them harbor the suspicion that simply recording a personal repre-
sentative's deed is too simple-whether the spouse is entitled to the
house by will, intestate succession, purchase, exempt property, or
allowance. 2 One routine method of transferring real estate passing
by intestate or testate succession, or by reason of an election to take
against the will, is by certificate of transfer issued by the probate
court and recorded in the recorder's office. 3 This method remains
unaffected by the new act. The preparation and filing of the forms
of application and certificate for transfer are very simple-involving
less work than closing an ordinary real estate transaction. If the
surviving spouse inherits the entire estate, or the property is willed
to him, the certificate of transfer remains the simplest method for
transferring the land.
However, in cases where the spouse has neither inherited nor
been willed the entire interest in the mansion house it has been neces-
sary for the spouse to exercise a statutory power to purchase the
mansion house at its appraised value.64 The new § 2105.062 of the
Revised Code provides speedier and more certain means of transfer-
ring the mansion house into the surviving spouse's name. If the
spouse's intestate share of the estate is equal to or greater than the
value of the decedent's interest in the mansion house, the spouse can
elect to take the property as part of his intestate share. The election
can be made at any time at or before the final account is filed. The
value used is the appraised value of the house, with all liens against
the property attributable to the decedent's interest deducted. 5 Use of
6! Conger v. Atwood, 28 Ohio St. 134 (1875).
61.1 Miller v. United States, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 31 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
62 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ -404, 3-907, 3-908, and 3-910 (1975 version). Under the
UPC, an instrument or deed of distribution is sufficient as a means of transfer, proof of title,
and protection for bona fide purchasers.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2113.61-.62 (Page 1968).
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.38 (Page Supp. 1975).
It is arguable that the new act, by giving the spouse an option to take at the appraised
value, regardless of appreciation or depreciation, makes it impossible to ascertain the value of
the marital deduction on the date of death. Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. (Part 1) 682.
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the appraised value means that the inventory and appraisal will be
highly significant. Although the spouse may make the election at a
later date, the value fixed in the inventory may become binding on
all parties unless timely exceptions are filed to the inventory.
A third method also exists in Ohio for transferring the mansion
house into the surviving spouse's name-purchase at its appraised
value.66 It will be necessary to use this method if the value of the
mansion house exceeds the surviving spouse's intestate share. How-
ever, it is not available if the house has been specifically devised to
someone else.6
The surviving spouse is given the right to purchase three classes
of property if they have not been specifically devised or bequeathed:
(1) the mansion house, which includes the land, any farm land or lots
adjacent to it and used in conjunction with the mansion house as the
home of the decedent, and the household goods in the mansion house
may be purchased at the appraised value; 8 (2) securities listed on an
approved stock exchange may be purchased at their market value on
the date of purchase;" (3) any other real or personal property of the
decedent may be purchased at its appraised value. However, property
purchased under this division may not exceed an amount, including
property purchased under (1) and (2), equal to one-third of the gross
appraised value of the estate."
The procedure for purchasing personal property under this sec-
tion is relatively simple. The spouse need file only a simple applica-
tion setting forth the property he wishes to purchase. If the property
consists of household goods in the mansion house or securities, the
court may approve the application without further hearing." How-
ever, with respect to other personal property, a hearing must be held,
and notice given to all interested parties.72
See also Minan, A Scrivener's "Delight"-The MaritalDeduction Formula Clause, 37 Oto
ST. L.J. 81, 92-95 (1976), which discusses the impact of that Revenue Procedure, and Ohio
Revised Code § 1339A1, dealing with testate estates. The Revenue Procedure specifically
includes provisions in applicable state law comparable to marital deduction destruction will
clauses. Section 1339.41, however, saves only wills and trusts-not intestate succession.




70 Id., § 2113.38(C).
79 Id., § 2113.38.
72 Id.
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The procedure for purchasing real property is more complex. It
requires filing of a formal petition, and specifies the interested parties
who must receive notice. The petition may not be filed prior to the
time the inventory of the estate is filed or later than one month after
the approval of the inventory. The Ohio statute contemplates a hear-
ing upon the inventory within one month after the filing of the inven-
tory.73 This means that the lawyer must be alert, for these time
limitations can trap the unwary and cost the spouse the opportunity
to purchase the mansion house.
Although the inventory statute74 affords interested parties an
opportunity to file exceptions and object to the appraisal, they may
also raise objections in the formal proceedings for the purchase of
real estate. 75 The court fixes terms of the sale and must order the
giving of an additional bond, unless it finds the original bond suffi-
cient.76 The surviving spouse must survive until the time a court enters
judgment authorizing the sale or his election to purchase is nullified. 77
If he dies thereafter, his representatives may complete the purchase.
The surviving spouse's right to purchase has been widely used as
a means of freeing the title to real estate from the interest of minor
children when the decedent dies intestate. Often the decedent had
only a one-half interest and arrangements can be made for the surviv-
ing spouse to purchase the entire property. The surviving spouse's
share in the estate can be applied against the purchase price. The
court's power to fix terms can be exercised so that the surviving
spouse can make payments that will go to her as guardian of her
children, and she can then be authorized as guardian to spend the
money for their support. This, however, is an expensive process, re-
quiring not only a land sale proceeding, but also continued account-
"' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2115.16 (Page 1968).
74 Id.
15 The court must approve the sale unless the appraisement was made as a result of
collusion or fraud or is so manifestly inadequate that the price would prejudice interested
persons. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.38 (Page Supp. 1975). The value of the premises at the
date of death is the value that is used. A certain amount of latitude is allowed in appraisement
and, where the surviving spouse's resources are small, it is obvious that a low appraisal may
be helpful. Since the survivor generally remains on the homestead until death, there will usually
be no adverse capital gains consequences.
76 Id. The requirement of an additional bond is one of the many little title traps that can
arise in probate proceedings relating to land. A title may be rejected if the additional bond is
not handled properly, since in theory the bond takes the real estate's place as available security




ing for the proceeds and the expense of related guardianship proceed-
ings.
Apart from its expense and delay, this arrangement has proved
very helpful in the administration of estates. Not only does it keep
the surviving spouse's home, but it also makes possible a later sale
without undue expense. Sharing the homestead ownership with com-
patible adult children is probably wiser than putting the spouse to the
probate expense of electing to purchase. But where minor children are
concerned, guardianship complexities, whether or not the property is
later sold, far outweigh the initial expense of electing to purchase at
the appraised value.
The UPC would allow the sale more quickly, and since the
surviving spouse would probably be the personal representative, the
surviving spouse could buy it personally with the approval of the
court.18 Her powers as personal representative would allow her to
make her own terms.7 Hence, in the typical mother-minor children
estate, the mother could get the property under the UPC a little more
easily and a little less expensively than under Ohio law. But, she
would not get the benefit of the low appraisement of a friendly ap-
praiser appointed by the court and she would be likely to be disap-
pointed by other parties who did not wish her to deal generously with
herself. If she were not the personal representative, the personal rep-
resentative might still sell the property to her at a friendly price.
However, she would run a greater risk of liability to creditors or to
other interested recipients of the estate.80
B. Exempt Property
UPC § 2-402 provides for a $3,500 exempt property allowance.
The UPC contemplates that the property will, if possible, be selected
from household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and
personal effects.8 However, any deficiency in the amount may be
made up from other assets of the estate. If the spouse survives, she
is entitled to the exempt property. If the spouse does not survive, all
'" UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-711 (1975 version). Ohio has made a small step in this
direction by permitting a surviving spouse who is an executor or administrator to purchase land
of the decedent with the consent of all interested parties, if no minor is an interested party.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2127.011 (Page Supp. 1975).
", UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-711 (1975 version).
- Id., § 3-713.
a' Id., § 2402.
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of the children of the decedent are entitled to share in the same
value.82
The reform act repealed former Ohio Revised Code § 2115.13,
which required the appraisers to set off to the surviving spouse or
minor children an amount not to exceed $2,500 in value as property
exempt from administration. However, Ohio has in one situation
created something comparable to exempt property. Ohio Revised
Code § 2113.532 permits the surviving spouse to acquire one automo-
bile of the decedent, unless it is disposed of by the will. Ohio Revised
Code § 4505.10 permits the surviving spouse to transfer the automo-
bile immediately without the signature of the personal representative.
All one need do is execute an assignment on the back of the certificate
of title and file an affidavit stating the date of the decedent's death,
that the automobile has not been specifically disposed of by will, and
a description and approximate valuation of the automobile. The clerk
of courts is authorized to transfer the automobile upon receipt of the
affidavit and the executed assignment of title.
The automobile is said to be "not an asset of the estate," al-
though it must be listed on the inventory.8 The statute reflects an
apparent intention that title questions and probate requirements be
completely eliminated with respect to automobile titles. The proce-
dure can probably be done before the probate of a will or application
for administration. In fact, there apparently need be no administra-
tion at all. If the transfer is wrongful, the legatees of the auto or the
living spouse falsely sworn to be a decedent will have to bring an
action against the deceitful spouse.
C. Family Allowance for Support
UPC § 2-403 provides for the determination and allowance of a
reasonable amount to support, during the period of administration,
the surviving spouse, minor and dependent children, and any other
child the decedent was in fact supporting. The allowance may not
continue for more than one year if the estate is insufficient to pay
allowable claims. The amount may be paid in a lump sum or in
periodic payments.84 If a child is not living with the spouse, his por-
9 Id.
13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.532 (Page Supp. 1975).
M UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (1975 version).
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tion may be paid in part to him or his guardian or custodian.* Other-
wise, it is payable to the spouse for the benefit of minor and depen-
dent children. The death of any person terminates his right to allow-
ances not yet paid.86
The Ohio probate reform act repealed former § 2117.20 of the
Ohio Revised Code which contained elaborate provisions for the de-
termination of a year's allowance for the support of the surviving
spouse and minor children. It enacts a new § 2117.20 which simply
gives the surviving spouse, or the children if there is no surviving
spouse, the sum of $5,000. The sum is considered to be assets of the
estate, in contrast to the automobile that the surviving spouse may
take. The distinction expresses a legislative recognition that the auto
can be transferable immediately without the possibility of title ques-
tions arising. On the other hand, there may not be $5,000 immediately
available to pay over and administration (or release from administra-
tion) may be legally necessary to convert assets into the money due
as the new family allowance.
D. Priority of Family Allowances
The homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allow-
ance all have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors under
the UPC." They do not, however, come ahead of costs and expenses
of administration, funeral expenses, the expenses of the last illness,
and debts and taxes with preference under federal or state law. In
terms of priority of the three among themselves, the homestead al-
lowance is paid first, then the family allowance, and finally the ex-
empt property.
Ohio's new $5,000 family allowance has priority over all claims
except costs of administration and funeral bills. The priority of fu-
neral expenses extends only to the first $800 of the funeral director's
bills, and to expenses other than the director's bill in amounts ap-
proved by the probate court.8
The automobile selected by the surviving spouse is not an asset
of the estate 9 and therefore will probably be treated as were assets
SId.
' Id.
Id., §§ 2-401, 2-402, 2-403.
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.25 (Page Supp. 1975).
I d., § 2113.532.
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exempt from administration under former law, i.e. free of claims of
unsecured creditors and of the estate.90
E. Testamentary Control over Family Provisions
Under the UPC, the testator may not bar the right of the surviv-
ing spouse and children to the homestead allowance, exempt prop-
erty, or family allowance." Furthermore, the rights are presumed to
be in addition to any benefits passing to the spouse or children under
the will. However, the testator may direct that the provision in the
will for his family be in lieu of these family rights. Such a provision
would operate to cut off the spouse's or children's rights under the
will if they accept the statutory family rights.
Under the Ohio law the testator may bar the right of his widow
to take any of his automobiles by disposing of the automobile under
his will.9 2 There is no provision, however, by which he may bar the
right of the spouse or minor children to the $5,000 family allowance.
He might well be able, however, to reduce a devise or bequest to the
spouse or children by $5,000 if the family allowance is paid.
F. Role of the Court and Personal Representative
UPC § 2-404 permits the surviving spouse, adult children, and
guardians of minor children to select property of the estate to make
up the homestead allowance and the exempt property. And, if they
fail to do so within a reasonable period of time, the personal repre-
sentative may make the selection. He may also make the selection if
there is no guardian of a minor child. 3 The personal representative,
regardless of who makes the selection, may execute a deed or instru-
ment of distribution to establish the ownership of the homestead and
exempt property.
The personal representative has the power to determine the fam-
ily allowance and may decide to pay it in a lump sum or periodic
installments. However, he is limited in this determination to a lump
" A dying, debt-ridden husband might be well advised to convert all his assets into the
most expensive and resaleable automobile he could purchase. The widow could transfer it into
her name and drive off into the sunset.
' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (1975 version).
'2 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.532 (Page Supp. 1975).




sum of $6,000 and periodic payments not exceeding $500 per month
for one year, although the court may increase or decrease the size of
the allowance. 6
Under the new Ohio law neither the probate court nor the per-
sonal representative has any role to play either in the determination
of the right of the surviving spouse to select an automobile from the
estate of the decedent 7 or in the transfer of its title.' Under general
principles of law, of course, the surviving spouse could compel the
personal representative to surrender possession of the automobile and
the certificate of title.
The personal representative must pay the $5,000 family allow-
ance out of the assets of the estate in the order of priority prescribed
by statute.9 He could ask the court for permission to distribute assets
of the estate in kind through a payment of the allowance instead of
first converting them to cash. However, such a distribution would
require express permission of the court, in contrast with the UPC
which generally permits the personal representative to take all steps
necessary without approval of the court, except to the extent that
restrictions are noted on his letters in an estate administered in super-
vised proceedings."'
IV. ELECTIVE SHARE OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. Right to an Elective Share
The UPC allows a surviving spouse to take an elective share of
one-third of the augmented estate subject to certain limitations.101
The UPC has thus adopted a spouse-protecting policy, and by its
broad definition of the augmented estate,' has made it difficult to
defeat the policy by inter vivos transactions effecting transfers at or
shortly prior to death.
The new Ohio law continues its policy of giving the spouse an
elective share of the decedent's probate estate,"'3 although it has
changed the procedures for this election."0 4 However, it does nothing
" Id.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.532 (Page Supp. 1975).
I7 d., § 4505.10.
I d., § 2117.25.
"a UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-704 (1975 version).
10' Id., § 2-201(a).
I- Id., § 2-202.
"I Om1o REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
10' Id., § 2107.391.
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to prevent the decedent from defeating the spouse's rights by transfers
at death other than by will. It is thus still an open question whether
the Ohio Supreme Court would permit the deliberate use of gifts,
remainder interests, or trusts executed shortly prior to death for the
purpose of leaving a surviving spouse destitute. °5
The basic difference between the UPC elective share and the
Ohio surviving spouse's share is that under the UPC the surviving
spouse may take an elective share whether the decedent dies testate
or intestate. Under the Ohio statute, however, the surviving spouse
has an election only if the decedent died testate.
The new law, like the old, permits the surviving spouse to elect
to take either under the will or under the Ohio statute of descent and
distribution.0 6 If the spouse elects to take under the statute, and not
under the will, the maximum share the spouse may receive is one-half
of the net probate estate.107 Thus even though the spouse is the sole
heir, she would only be entitled to one-half of an estate bequeathed
entirely to the decedent's paramour."0 ' The spouse may take the maxi-
mum one-half interest only if she is the sole survivor or if a child of
the decedent survives. If two or more children survive, the maximum
share the spouse may take is limited to one-third of the net probate
estate.' Thus it is possible that a disinherited surviving spouse left
with two children to support may be worse off than one with only a
single child.
Although the surviving spouse is entitled to the first $30,000 of
an intestate estate if the decedent leaves issue only by her, or to the
first $10,000 if the decedent leaves issue by another person, the spouse
who elects to take against the will, will in practical effect be deprived
of either amount. Thus if the decedent's" net estate is $30,000, a sole
surviving spouse could elect to take only $15,000. If there are also two
or more surviving issue of the decedent he could only elect to take
$10,000. Therefore, for purposes of computation of the surviving
spouse's elective share, the Ohio intestate provisions allowing the
spouse a monetary priority"' become meaningless.
' Smyth v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
100 OH1o REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page Supp. 1975).
,07 Id., § 2107.39.
108 Although it has not yet been the subject of a reported case, it would seem clear that, in
such a case, the paramour has a third party beneficiary malpractice claim against the lawyer
who prepared the will for failing to place the assets in an inter vivos trust naming the paramour
as death beneficiary.
10' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
110 Id., § 2105.06.
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B. Multistate Estates
The multistate transaction rule of the UPC is that the law of
domicile of the decedent governs the right of the surviving spouse to
take a share in the decedent's estate."' The rationale for this rule is
that the state of domicile has the paramount interest in the incidents
of the marital estate, while the sole interest of the state of probate in
the property is to insure title stability. These UPC provisions are
consistent with the general philosophy of the Restatement of Con-
flicts of Laws Second. However, with respect to this specific issue,
the Restatement recognizes that established decisions generally fol-
low their own local law.112
Existing Ohio case law runs contrary to the UPC. Pfau v.
Moseley"' held that a nonresident widow was entitled to take an
elective share of Ohio real estate, despite the fact that she and her
husband were domiciled in New Jersey. Under the law of New
Jersey, where the decedent's will had also been admitted to probate,
the widow was not permitted to make such an election. The court
based its reasoning essentially on its determination of legislative in-
tent as it construed the legislative language. The court also expressed
the fear that permitting the law of another state to govern the title
to Ohio land would eliminate the certainty, uniformity, predictability,
and convenience that there would be if it made that title dependent
only upon its own internal law.
The Pfau decision confined its ruling to real estate and expressed
no opinion with respect to movable property. The decision also leaves
open questions of true conflicts that may arise where the surviving
spouse's election might be inconsistent with her action in the state of
domicile or in other states where the testator's property might be
located.
From the point of view of a title examiner, it is difficult to see
how local titles could be unsettled by denial of the right to elect, since
denial of a surviving spouse's right to elect under the will would have
to be recorded in a judicial decision in Ohio. The decision of a local
court would be conclusive. It appears more likely that the courts
would be unsettled by the prospect of having to rule on the law of
forty-nine other states plus foreign countries.
With respect to the time within which the right to elect should
... UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-201(b) (1975 version).
tlz RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 241, 242 (1971).
i 9 Ohio St. 2d 13, 222 N.E.2d 639 (1966).
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be exercised, however, Ohio law should control or title examination
would be rendered difficult. A title examiner finding a foreign will
probated in his state should not be put to the task of examining
proceedings in other states or the law of other states. He ought to be
entitled to rely upon the procedures and time limitations established
within his state for judicial assertion of rights created in other states.
C. Estate from which the Elective Share Is Taken
The UPC provisions insure that the surviving spouse's marital
rights are not defeated by will substitutes. The spouse is given a share,
not only of the probate estate, but also of assets that the decedent
might have transferred in other ways in order to defeat the marital
rights of the spouse."4 On the other hand, it also precludes the spouse
who has received assets from the decedent during his lifetime, or non-
probate assets upon his death, from taking more than the decedent
anticipated from the probate estate."5
The draftsmen have taken the position that if the spouse is to
be protected the protection should not be spurious. They have not
asserted that all states should adopt the elective-share provisions of
the code. Obviously, however, uniformity of policy nationwide is
desirable. Otherwise, one might find all states permitting deflation of
the probate estate in order to prevent prospective decedents from
transferring assets to other states in order to bar their spouses, while
at the same time their statutes reject such a practice with respect to
probate assets within the control of the state.
UPC § 2-202 includes, but is not limited to, what Ohio would
call the "net probate estate", i.e. the estate reduced by administration
expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemptions,
and enforceable claims. It adds to this estate certain gratuitous trans-
fers made during the marriage that are roughly comparable to trans-
fers that would be included in the decedent's estate for federal estate
tax purposes."' Thus transfers with retained right of income or pos-
session," 7 transfers with retained powers to revoke or dispose of prin-
cipal,11 8 transfers into survivorship property,"' or gifts in excess of
.. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1975 version).
" Id., § 2-202.
"' Id., § 2-202(1).
117 Id., § 2-202(1)(i).
"' Id., § 2-202(1)(ii).
I' Id., § 2-202(I)(iii).
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$3,000 to any person in the two years preceding death 12 are all added
to arrive at the total value of the augmented estate. If the wife con-
sents to the transfer in writing, or joins in the transfer, the property
is excluded from the augmented estate.21
The augmented estate does not include life insurance, accident
insurance, joint annuities, or pensions payable to persons other than
the surviving spouse. 22 The long term investment of the decedent in
such programs, risk factors, and valuation problems all make these
transactions generally unsuitable for disinheriting spouses. Including
them in the augmented estate would also place a burden upon the
insurance and pension industries far out of proportion to the benefit
on those occasions when including them might eliminate disinherited
spouses from the welfare rolls.
The UPC, to avoid the disruption of the decedent's estate plan
by a spouse who has already received substantial amounts of prop-
erty, deducts from the augmented estate any assets that the surviving
spouse derived gratuitously from the decedent during his lifetime.'2
The provisions relating to property derived from the decedent were
drawn with extreme care, and cannot be easily summarized. Ohio has
no corresponding law.
The property deducted is valued at the date of death if it is owned
by the spouse.124 If it has been transferred by the spouse to another
person, and the transfer becomes irrevocable before death, the prop-
erty is valued at that time rather than at the date of death.'2
Income that has been earned on property derived from the dece-
dent prior to death is not included as property derived from the
decedent. 26 Inclusion of income would inject considerable mathemat-
ical complexity in proof of ownership, particularly since the spouse
bears the burden of proving not only the extent of the decedent's
nonprobate assets includible in the augmented estate, but also of
demonstrating that property owned by the spouse when the decedent
dies or that the surviving spouse transferred prior to the death, is not
12 Id., § 2-202(I)(iv).
121 Id., § 2-202(l).
I- Id., § 2-202(3)(i).
12, Id., § 2-202(3). It also deducts any assets gratuitously transferred to other persons by
the spouse during marriage that would have been included in the surviving spouse's estate had
she predeceased the actual decedent.
I- Id., § 2-202(2).
1'2 Id.
12 Id.
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to be deducted from the augmented estate. An accurate accounting
would be impossible.
Under the Ohio law, the surviving spouse takes her elective
share from the net probate estate.121 Property passing other than by
testate or intestate succession at death is not included.12 Property
of the surviving spouse derived from the decedent and property
transferred by the decedent that might have been included in the
surviving spouse's taxable estate if she had died before the testator
are not charged against the surviving spouse's intestate share.
The net estate in Ohio would include all of the property passing
testate, but none of the property passing intestate. Administration
expenses, funeral expenses, family allowances, taxes, and all other
expenses would be deducted.2 9 Since the automobile is not part of the
assets of the estate, however, and no provision is made in the elective
share statute with reference to the automobile, it would appear that
if the testator has devised the automobile to the surviving spouse she
can keep the automobile and still obtain an elective share.
There are really no important Ohio cases with respect to the use
of contracts, deeds, and gifts as will substitutes. The few lower court
cases follow the general rule that if a transaction meets the technical
requirements of a particular transaction, it is not a testamentary
disposition of property. For a time, however, Ohio followed the rule
that the surviving spouse could elect to take a share of assets passing
at the decedent's death under a revocable inter vivos trust.' 0 This
rule was laid to rest by Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co.,13 1 which held
that an inter vivos trust was not testamentary merely because the
grantor retained both the beneficial interest in the trust property and
the power to revoke it during his lifetime. The court reviewed the
checkered history of the revocable trust in Ohio, and reversed all
cases inconsistent with its decision. Its reasoning was based primarily
on a doctrinal analysis of the differences between a will, an agency,
and a trust, and on a literal interpretation of the statutes.
'2' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
"2 Smyth v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
"I The deduction for taxes has caused problems in Ohio where the election has been made
in order to take advantage of the marital deduction. The Ohio Supreme Court has forced the
electing spouse to bear a share of the tax in the teeth of the testator's direct command that the
entire estate pay all taxes, even though her share would be deductible. Campbell v. Lloyd, 162
Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1961).
0 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
,at 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961).
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The Smyth case is generally regarded by Ohio lawyers as ex-
pressing a policy permitting disinheritance of spouses. It should be
noted, however, that the court in Smyth expressly noted that "no
fraud is involved here. '1 32 The trust had been established by the
grantor five years prior to his death, and his widow had accompanied
him to the trust company and knew he was establishing a trust. It is
at least arguable, therefore, that the Ohio Supreme Court might rule
differently with respect to a transfer made secretly a short time prior
to death with intent to defeat the elective share of the spouse.
D. Right of Election is Personal
UPC § 2-203 provides that the right of election of the surviving
spouse may be exercised only during his lifetime and only by him if
he is competent. If the spouse is a protected person,' 33 only the court
can make the election for him. The court must do so by order, after
finding that the exercise is necessary to provide adequate support for
the protected person during his probable life expectancy.'34 The UPC
provides that courts may appoint a conservator or make any other
protective order for the person. Provisions for protective orders make
it easier to administer the estate of the protected person and avoid
the necessity for appointment of a conservator in smaller estates.
In Ohio, the right of election is also personal to the spouse, but
it takes more reading time to arrive at the conclusion. Rather than
simply providing affirmatively that the spouse must elect in her life-
time, § 2107.41 provides negatively that if she dies before probate,
survives probate but fails to make an election, or dies before the
expiration of the time within which she might have made an election,
she is conclusively presumed to have elected to take under the will.
It then recites the obvious, that the heirs, devisees, and legatees are
bound by the election, and that persons may deal with the property
of the decedent accordingly. Fiduciaries and beneficiaries under the
will have no standing to question the determination." 5
The Ohio law also makes § 2105.21 of the Revised Code (barring
the spouse from any rights in the decedent's estate if the spouse dies
2 172 Ohio St. at 503, 179 N.E.2d at 69.
11 A protected person is a minor or someone who for some reason is unable to manage
his affairs. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-101 (1975 version).
"' Id., § 2-203.
"' In re Estate of Cook, 19 Ohio St. 2d 121, 249 N.E.2d 799 (1969).
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within thirty days after the decedent) applicable to the election. The
UPC has no corresponding provision with respect to the surviving
spouse. However, under the UPC all heirs and devisees must survive
the decedent by 120 hours in order to be able to share in the estate. 36
Under the Ohio law3 7 the court must also make the election for
the person under legal disability. However, the standard which guides
the court is whether the provision made for the spouse in the will or
the provision under the law is better for the spouse. 38 The court is
assisted in its decision by the report of a person appointed to investi-
gate the value of each alternative.
The leading case on this matter, In re the Estate of Strauch,39
held that the court cannot consider the effect of a widow's election
upon legatees, heirs, next of kin, or the tax collector. Even though
the widow did not need the assets under the will, and would very likely
have followed the testator's intention had she been competent, the
court of appeals reversed a probate court decision that would have
given her own legatees $44,102.50 rather than $26,500.00 upon her
death. The court recognized that factors other than the mere value
of property may be taken into consideration. Both the court of ap-
peals and the supreme court held that the legatees and trustees under
the will had no standing to contest the guardian's appeal from the
probate court's determination to elect that the incompetent spouse
take against the will. 4
The most significant difference, then, is that the UPC allows the
carrying out of the decedent's estate plan, except to the extent that
the court will not leave a minor or incompetent person unsupported
if the elective share will provide such support. The Ohio law, as
presently interpreted, may permit the carrying out of some decedent's
estate plans, but defeats others. However, the Ohio law may in many
instances make possible a better life for the incompetent, and give a
minor surviving spouse the same choice that she would have the right
to make as an adult.
'3' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, 2-601 (1975 version).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.45 (PAGE 1968).
'x Id.
,31 IL Ohio App. 2d 173, 229 N.E.2d 95 (1965), affd on other grounds, 15 Ohio St. 2d
192, 239 N.E.2d 43 (1968).
"I However, the law is not entirely settled on this point, since an earlier probate court
decision in another appellate district held that the court could elect to permit an incompetent
husband to take nothing under his wife's will. In re Estate of Rieley, 194 N.E.2d 918 (P. Ct.
1963). Both spouses' wills were made pursuant to a plan whereby the wife left all her property
to their grandchildren in order to minimize taxes. It is difficult to imagine an election any better
for the spouse than to comply with her wishes where the circumstances have not changed.
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E. Waiver of the Right to Elect
The UPC expresses a strong policy in favor of waiver of marital
rights. All rights, including the elective share, homestead allowance,
exempt property, and family allowance may be waived, in whole or
part.'4 ' The waiver must be in the form of a signed written contract
agreement, or waiver, which may be executed before or after mar-
riage. There is no requirement of a fair and adequate consideration,
but a fair disclosure must be made to the spouse before she signs the
waiver.
To expedite settlements, the UPC provides that a waiver of all
rights (or equivalent language) in the property or estate of the spouse
waives all rights to the elective share and allowances, and also re-
nounces all benefits of intestate succession or testate succession under
a will executed prior to the waiver.4 2 A complete property settlement
after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is also a complete
waiver of such rights.
The Ohio law favors antenuptial and separation contractual
agreements, but does not allow post-nuptial agreement or simple
waiver. Ohio Revised Code § 2131.03 expresses this policy by a pecu-
liar reverse time limitation period. Whereas most statutes of limita-
tions bar the right to bring an action on a contract, the Ohio law holds
that any antenuptial or separation agreement to which the decedent
was a party is valid unless its validity is attacked within six months
after the appointment of the executor or administrator. Otherwise the
decedent's estate must perform the contract.' The surviving spouse
may be even further surprised to discover that the dead man's statute
bars his testimony as to any oral modification or rescission of the
agreement.
An antenuptial agreement must be in writing."4 However, the
writing may be executed after the wedding if the agreement was made
before the marriage.4 5 The surviving spouse should be aware that the
dead man's statute bars his testimony as to any oral modification or
rescission of the agreement.' Written separation agreements are
specifically authorized by statute and may waive all marital and other
14' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-204 (1975 version).
142 Id.
" Cantor v. Cantor, 15 Ohio Op. 2d. 148, 174 N.E.2d 304 (P. Ct. 1959).
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page 1962); Finch v. Finch, 10 Ohio St. 501 (1860).
," In re Estate of Weber, 170 Ohio St. 567, 167 N.E.2d 98 (1960).
'6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.03 (Page Supp. 1974); Mosier v. Mosier, 133 N.E.2d
202 (P. Ct. 1954).
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rights in the decedent's estate.'47 The statute also provides, however,
that the husband and wife cannot by any contract "except for an
immediate separation agreement" alter their legal relations with each
other."8 Thus to accomplish such an agreement in Ohio it would be
necessary to establish a trust."'
The Ohio cases relating to antenuptial and separation agree-
ments require, in addition to full disclosure, that the share of the
surviving spouse not be disproportionate to the share she would be
entitled to by law. 5 ' The Ohio statute thus inhibits estate planning
by a contract between agreeable spouses, out of a perhaps outdated
fear that the surviving spouse would otherwise be defenseless.
F. Proceedings in Election to Take
(1) Initiation of the Proceedings
Under UPC § 2-205, the surviving spouse must take the initiative
to claim an elective share in the augmented estate.'5' To do so she
must file a petition in the court within nine months after the date of
death, or within six months after the date of probate of the will,
whichever is later. 2 If the spouse files a petition after the expiration
of nine months from the date of death, only probate assets will be
included in the augmented estate. 5 A timely filing of the petition is
therefore essential. Excluding nonprobate transfers serves to clear the
title of those assets transferred from the lien of the elective share. In
contrast probate assets may be controlled by a will offered for pro-
bate as late as three years after death.' There is thus no reason for
an earlier barring of the lien on probate assets.
The time for filing the petition may be extended by the court
before the time for election has expired.15 The spouse will therefore
"' OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.06 (Page 1972).
IS The Ohio Supreme Court has held that this section renders a post-nuptial contract
providing for the release of all interests invalid, including dower and distributive shares in the
estate of the decedent. Dubois v. Koen, 100 Ohio St. 17, 125 N. E. 121 (1919).
"' Another possible method would be to join in a dissolution of marriage ceremony in the
domestic relations court, as permitted by Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3105.61-.65, execute an antenup-
tial agreement at counsel's desk, and then return to the judge's chambers for the remarriage
ceremony.
5I Mintier v. Mintier, 28 Ohio St. 307 (1876); In re Shafer, 77 Ohio App. 105, 65 N.E.2d
902 (1944).
"'I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205(a) (1975 version).
132 Id.
153 Id.
"' UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (1975 version).
! Id., § 2-205(a).
PROBATE CODE
have an adequate opportunity to investigate and determine the most
advantageous course to take. The additional time afforded will not
delay the administration and distribution of the estate, since the per-
sonal representative is not required to hold assets after the time for
filing a petition has expired. The personal representative is authorized
to make distribution without order of the court, 56 and distributees
would be required to contribute to any after-determined elective
share. 5 7 If the personal representative desires protection in making
the distribution, he may notify persons entitled to object to the distri-
bution. This right to object is terminated if the person does not object
within thrity days after mailing or delivery of the proposal.'58 The
personal representative may also invoke the jurisdiction of the court
with respect to any question concerning the estate or its administra-
tion.'59
After the petition is filed, the case would proceed as a formal
judicial proceeding with notice and an opportunity for hearing af-
forded to all parties. There is no provision in the UPC whereby the
spouse can be compelled to exercise the right of election because
under the UPC there is no reason for delay in the administration of
the estate or for a bona fide purchaser to reject the title of the per-
sonal representative' or a distributee'll on the ground that the sur-
viving spouse's election may affect the bona fide purchaser. In each
case, the bona fide purchaser is protected.162 Further, assets pur-
chased by a bona fide purchaser from the decedent are not included
in the augmented estate,' and only original transferees of nonpro-
bate assets included in the augmented estate or their donees are re-
quired to contribute from assets included in the augmented estate in
order to make up the elective share.'64
In contrast to the UPC, Ohio law is very concerned with the
time limits within which the spouse is required to make an election. 65
"' Id., § 3-703.
I3' Id., § 3-909.
' Id., § 3-908.
I3' d., § 3-704.
I' d., § 3-714.
'Id., § 3-910.
122 Id., §§ 3-714, 3-910.
1- Id., § 2-202.
"' Id., § 2-207.
" Ofiio REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975). The former law making it optional
for the personal representative or the court to send the citation has been repealed.
However, the recent reforms have retained the provisions of former law permitting the
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In order to eliminate delay in settling estates the new act now re-
quires the probate court rather than the surviving spouse to take the
initiative. The court must issue a citation by certified mail to the sur-
viving spouse to elect whether she shall take under the will or under
§ 2105.06 of the Ohio statute of descent and distribution. The
probate court must issue the citation immediately after the personal
representative files the inventory and schedule of debts. Only after
the inventory and schedule of debts have been filed will there be a
record from which the court can inform the surviving spouse of his
rights under the will and under the law. Ohio law requires the per-
sonal representative, unless the court extends the time, to file the
inventory and appraisement within one month after his appoint-
ment, '8 and to file the schedule of debts, in accordance with rules to
be adopted by each probate court, within three months and no later
than five months, after his appointment.'67 Thus unless the court has
extended the filing time, the earliest moment at which the probate
court could issue the citation would be after three months from the
appointment. However, it has not been unusual in the past for inven-
tories and schedules of debts to be filed late. Adoption of the probate
reform act, with its goal of completed administration within four or
five months of the personal representative's appointment, may signal
an intent by probate judges to insist upon prompt filing, since the
judge and his deputies will know that they must cause a citation to
be issued. They may be expected to be greatly concerned if they
cannot perform their appointed duty at the appointed time.
surviving spouse to make an election within three months after the disposition of any proceed-
ings for advice or to contest the validity of the will. Under Ohio law, therefore, it appears that
the spouse may extend the time for his election by taking action within the one-month period,
requesting an extension of time within which to make the election. During that time, he may
also file proceedings for construing the will. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.40 (Page Supp.
1975).
The recent amendments reduce the time period within which a will contest action must be
brought from six months to four months. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.23 (Page Supp. 1975).
I f a will contest is brought before the expiration of the time within which the spouse must elect,
the time for election would be automatically extended. It is not clear what the effect would be
of a will contest brought after the time to elect expired.
,66 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2115.05 (Page Supp. 1975).
167 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.15 (Page Supp. 1975). Claims of creditors must be filed
within three months after the appointment, since the appointment requires publication that
includes a notice to creditors to present claims to the personal representative. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2117.06, 2113.08 (Page Supp. 1975). Hence, the executor or administrator should not
file the schedule of debts until the three-month period has expired.
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(2) Notice to Other Parties
Under UPC § 2-205(b), the surviving spouse must not only serve
a copy of notice of petition upon the personal representative, but also
notify all persons interested in the estate and all persons whose inter-
ests in the augmented estate might be adversely affected. This would
include transferees entitled to nonprobate assets that are included in
the augmented estate.
The probate court is required to notify the personal representa-
tive that it has issued a citation notifying the surviving spouse to
make an election. 6 No one else need be notified. The reason for this
is twofold. First, the Ohio theory is that the amount that the surviving
spouse will take, either under the law or under the will, is absolutely
fixed by the values shown on the inventory and the schedule of debts.
The surviving spouse can compare the will and the law and easily
determine which share is greater and what its total tax and estate
planning consequences will be.'69 Second, the executor has standing
to make an objection as to whether a particular surviving spouse is
entitled to exercise an election. 170 Logically, the executor could also
object to the timeliness and manner of exercising the election. The
remedy of other interested parties would be to bring an action if the
executor refused to do so,' or to object to his accounting.
(3) Right to Withdraw Election
Under the UPC, the surviving spouse may withdraw the demand
for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination
by the court.7 2 There is no reason for requiring a binding election
prior to such time, although finality of judicial determinations re-
quires that the surviving spouse not be permitted to withdraw there-
after. Taxes, creditors, and titles might also be adversely affected by
a later withdrawal.
An early Ohio case held that a widow could not revoke a pro-
perly made election, even where the attempted revocation was made
before the expiration of the time allowed for an election.17 3 The court
'6' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.391 (Page Supp. 1975).
, If heirs and devisees wish to object, the proper procedure is to object to the inventory
appraisements and schedule of debts.
" In re Estate of Gould, I Ohio Op. 2d 366, 140 N.E.2d 793 (P. Ct. 1956), aff'd I Ohio
Op. 2d 372, 140 N.E.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1956).
1' OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.46 (1975).
27 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205(c) (1975 version).
'T= Davis v. Davis, I I Ohio St. 386 (1860).
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held that permitting the widow to do so would make a mockery of
the election, although it recognized that an election could be set aside
in case of fraud, imposition, misrepresentation, and mistake. The
Ohio cases since have adhered to this viewpoint.'
It is open to question whether these older cases have any practi-
cal effect when the spouse elects, under the present form of the stat-
ute, to take under the will. Under § 2107.41 of the Ohio Revised Code
a surviving spouse who fails to make an election to take either against
or under the will within the time provided by law is conclusively
presumed to take under the will. The conclusive presumption has
been held constitutional where the surviving spouse was insane. 75
Thus it appears that a surviving spouse can elect to take against the
will only by making a valid election within the short period of time
allowed. Such an election to take against the will might be set aside
for cause, but it does not appear possible to set aside an election to
take under the will after the very brief period for election expires.
Setting aside an election to take under the will could not affect the
conclusive presumption that the spouse had elected to take under the
will by reason of failure to make a timely election to take against
the will. 176
Although a surviving spouse cannot revoke an election to take
under the will, she can renounce the share she has elected to take
under the will. 7 Presumably, the reason for electing to take under
the will and then renouncing its benefits would be to expedite admin-
istration and assure that objects of the testator's bounty (unless ren-
unciation caused property to descend intestate) would receive benefits
without further administration expenses or taxes. The Ohio statute 17
with respect to renouncing will benefits has no time limitation, but
"I Bell v. Henry, 121 Ohio St. 241, 167 N.E. 880 (1929); Mellinger v. Mellinger, 73 Ohio
St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906).
"7 In re Wolfel, 3 Ohio App. 2d 11, 209 N.E.2d 594 (1965).
"' The Ohio Supreme Court decided, under a former version of the statute, that a widow
who had elected to take under a will was not, however, estopped from later contesting the will.
Carder v. Commissioners, 16 Ohio St. 353 (1865). The court reasoned that her election did not
prejudice other claimants, but that they would obtain an unfair advantage over her unless she
could contest the will. If she declined to take under the will, believing it to be invalid, but a
later contest established its validity, she would have lost her right to elect to take under the
will.
The question should not arise under the present law, since the statute extends the time for
making an election to include any period during which an action to construe or contest the will
is pending.
7 In re Estate of Hartman, 29 Ohio Op. 256 (P. Ct. 1944).
"i' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.60 (Page 1968).
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presumably the common-law rule requiring renunciation within a
reasonable time after probate would be applicable.
It is very doubtful that a case would ever arise in which an Ohio
surviving spouse would attempt to elect to take against the will, and
then renounce the share she would take under the law. Miller v.
Miller' holds that the share of the surviving spouse is not an intes-
tate share but is a share given by the statute establishing the right to
elect to take against the will and under the law. Further, the Ohio
statute permitting renunciation of an intestate share requires the
renunciation to be made within sixty days after notice of hearing on
the inventory."' This time limitation is inconsistent with the time
limitation established for the surviving spouse's election.
UPC § 2-801 permits renunciation, within a general limitation
period of six months after the decedent's death, of both testate and
intestate succession as well as of interests passing pursuant to the
exercise of powers. It thus permits post-mortem estate planning to
an extent not possible under Ohio law.
(4) Determination of the Elective Share
The determination of an elective share under the UPC may be
made only by the court after notice and hearing.' The burden is on
the surviving spouse to prove the share to which she is entitled. The
court must also fix the liability of any person, other than the personal
representative, who has an interest in or possession of property in-
cluded in the augmented estate. The liability of the person cannot
exceed the amount he would have to contribute if all parties subject
to contribution were made parties. 1 2 However, the spouse is not re-
quired to make parties to the action all persons who might, by reason
of having received transfers from the decedent, be subject to contribu-
tion to the spouse's elective share.
In contrast to the UPC requirement that the surviving spouse
prove the share of the augmented estate which she is entitled to take,
the entire thrust of the Ohio law is that the court must assist and
protect her in determining the share she is entitled to under the will
and under the law.8 3 Only when the spouse succeeds to the entire
17 129 Ohio St. 230, 194 N.E. 450 (1935).
' OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.061 (Page 1968).
IRI UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205(d) (1975 version).
182 Id.
IKI If the spouse is under a legal disability, the court must make the election for her after
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estate of the decedent under the will is a burden placed upon the
spouse to take affirmative action to elect to take against the will.'8
The recent amendment requires the initial citation issued by the
court to describe the effect of the election and the general rights of
the spouse.' 85 It must state that the surviving spouse has a right to
bring an action to construe the will. It must also advise her of the
presumption that arises if she does not make an election within the
one-month period. 8 '
The Ohio policy in favor of a spouse's electing to take under a
will is evident from the language of the recent amendments. No
particular formal procedure is required. The statute merely provides
"[t]he surviving spouse electing to take under the will may manifest
the election in writing."'' 87 However, an election to take against the
will must be made before the probate judge, 88 a deputy clerk refe-
ree,'8 9 or a commissioner appointed by the court."8 ' The judge, referee
or commissioner must explain the will, the spouse's rights under it,
and the spouse's rights under the law if she refuses to take under the
will.
Care must be exercised, particularly by counsel, in advising the
spouse of her rights. The case law in this area is meager but a lower
court opinion indicates that the election may be set aside if either the
court or counsel misleads the spouse.'
(5) Enforcement of the Election
Under the UPC, the personal representative distributes the pro-
bate estate in accordance with the order determining the elective
share. However, as to persons who have received nonprobate assets,
appointing a suitable person to investigate which provision is better for the spouse. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.45 (Page 1968).
'" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
' Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.391 (Page Supp. 1975). The new act contains the follow-
ing ambiguous language: "The description of the effect of the election and of the rights of the
spouse need not relate to the nature of any particular estate." Presumably it uses the term
"particular estate" to mean the content of the particular decedent's estate.
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.391(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
's' OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.391(C) (Page Supp. 1975). Presumably a court
would construe this as requiring the written election to be signed and filed before it is binding.
Otherwise, a fickle or uninformed spouse would be bound by an instrument not of record,
although she might desire to change her mind.
,, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.43 (Page Supp. 1975).
,I ld.
,90 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.44 (Page 1968).
'" Smith v. First National Bank, 124 N.E.2d 851 (C.P. Tuscarawas Cty. 1954).
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the court order would have to be enforced in a separate action for
contribution or payment. 9'
Since the Ohio law applies only to the probate estate, in contrast
to the UPC, the personal representative would distribute the probate
estate in accordance with the election. The spouse might be able to
bring a direct action, under the law relating to fraudulent convey-
ances, against persons who had fraudulently received assets from a
decedent. However, the normal procedure would be for the spouse to
demand that the personal representative bring the action, and, if the
representative refused, bring an appropriate action in which the per-
sonal representative would be a party.
(6) Effect of the Election upon Provisions in the Will
Under the UPC § 2-206, the spouse who takes an elective share
does not lose any benefits under testate or intestate succession, unless
the spouse specifically renounces such benefits. This is so because
these benefits are applied first to satisfy the surviving spouse's elective
share before recipients of the balance of the augmented estate are
required to contribute to the elective share.
The spouse is permitted to renounce either testate or intestate
succession because by so doing she does not gain at the expense of
such recipients. Probate property which the spouse might have kept
will pass to others, presumably the objects of his bounty, as though
she had predeceased the testator. Thus, the spouse may defeat taxes
and expenses of administration upon later decease, without losing the
right to obtain contribution from the deceased spouse's transferees.
The persons taking the interests renounced by the spouse are not
liable for contributing to the elective share of the augmented estate
that the spouse does take, since the interest renounced is charged to
the elective share. 93
Under the recent Ohio amendments it is clear that by electing
to take under the law the surviving spouse is treated as "thereby
refusing to take under the will." '94 Accordingly, the spouse will re-
ceive no benefit under the will-apparently even if the will expressly
provides that a spouse who elects to take against the will may take
benefits under it. The Ohio law, like the UPC, provides that the
surviving spouse's share shall be disposed of as if she predeceased the
192 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205(e) (1975 version).
,3 Id., § 2-207.
" OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.43 (Page Supp. 1975).
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 321 (1976)
testator.' However, remainders are not accelerated unless the will
provides otherwise.19 The UPC leaves questions of acceleration to
the common law.
The surviving spouse who elects to take under the will is of
course entitled to the benefit of all of the will's provisions for her. The
spouse is also entitled to an intestate share of "that portion of the
estate as to which the decedent dies testate."' 9 7 However, the section
also retains apparently inconsistent language stating that the spouse
"shall be barred of all right to an intestate share of the property
passing under the will. . . unless it plainly appears from the will that
the provision for the spouse was intended to be in addition to an
intestate share." '98 The statute was amended to add the language that
the surviving spouse is entitled to an intestate share of that portion
of the estate as to which the decedent dies testate, after Jones v.
Webster 9' held that the language quoted above barred a widow from
taking an intestate share of property that the testator had tried, but
failed to dispose of in his will. The court ruled that the testator's
attempt to create a trust in the property was void, and hence, the
property passed intestate to all the heirs except the widow.
(7) Effect of Election on Family Provisions
UPC § 2-206 states that the surviving spouse is entitled to the
homestead allowance, exempt property, or family allowance, whether
or not she elects to take an elective share. Thus in order to discourage
a disruptive election, the estate plan must at least give to the surviving
spouse a minimum value equivalent to the value of the family provi-
sions, plus the elective share. The UPC policy, simple in application,
is that this minimum value is the fair share to which a surviving
spouse is entitled, whether the decedent's estate passes by inter vivos
transfer, intestate succession, or testate succession. Thus an election
to take an elective share has no effect on the family rights.
It is clear that in Ohio a surviving spouse who elects to take
against the will is entitled to receive the family allowance and to live
in the mansion house for one year in addition to the intestate share.
Even a spouse who elects to take under the will is entitled to these
"' Id., § 2107.39.
Id.
"' Id., § 2107.42.
"' Id. (emphasis added).
"' 133 Ohio St. 492, 14 N.E.2d 928 (1938).
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rights, in addition to the benefits passing under the will, unless the
will expressly otherwise directs. 20 Hence, to discourage a disruptive
election, the estate plan must give the surviving spouse a minimum
value equivalent to the value of the intestate share plus the value of
the family allowance and of the right to live in the mansion house.
The decedent may, however, be able to successfully prevent the sur-
viving spouse from taking either an automobile or the "mansion
house." These rights may not be exercised if the automobile has been
"otherwise disposed of by the will"20 1 or the mansion house has been
"specifically . . . devised. ' 02
It is possible that the surviving spouse will be able to successfully
take the mansion house in any event, under new § 2105.062 of the
Ohio Revised Code. That section contains no exception covering a
mansion house that has been specifically devised. Section 2107.39 of
the Ohio Revised Code gives the spouse the right to elect to take
either "under the will or under § 2105.06 of the Revised Code."
Section 2105.062 of the Ohio Revised Code states that the "surviving
spouse may elect to receive, as part of his share of the intestate estate
under § 2105.06 of the Revised Code, the entire interest of the dece-
dent spouse in the mansion house." An argument can be made that
the right to take "under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code" in-
cludes the right to take the mansion house if the electing spouse's
share equals or exceeds the value of the mansion house. A counter
argument can be made, however, that § 2105.062 of the Ohio Revised
Code refers only to a mansion house in "the intestate estate." Fur-
ther, it could be asserted that § 2107.39 of the Ohio Revised Code
would have referred to § 2105.062 if it had been intended to include
it. It seems unlikely that the General Assembly would give a right so
disruptive of a testator's wishes or so unequally applicable to different
estates without clearly expressing such an intent. Finally, it could be
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.42 (Page Supp. 1975).
I' d., § 2113.532. An interesting problem could arise if the estate consists of nothing but
specifically devised automobiles. Section 2113.532 of the Ohio Revised Code states that the
spouse is entitled to take an automobile only if it is "not otherwise disposed of by testamentary
disposition." Is an automobile "disposed of by testamentary disposition" if the surviving
spouse's election to take against the will makes it certain that at least one or more automobiles
will not pass according to the will? Since the automobile the spouse is entitled to select will
not be a part of the decedent's estate, the most logical conclusion is that a clause in the will
disposing of an automobile ought to defeat the surviving spouse's election, even though her
election to take against the will may ultimately prevent the legatee from receiving the automo-
bile.
2.2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.38 (Page Supp. 1975).
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argued that the sole purpose of the section is to expedite settlement
of intestate estates.
(8) Effect of Surviving Spouse's Separate Estate
The UPC does not consider the extent of the surviving spouse's
separate estate in determining his elective share unless the property
in the estate has been derived from the decedent and is includible in
the augmented estate. The augmented estate includes the value of
property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death, plus
the value of property transferred by the spouse at any time which
would have been included in the spouse's augmented estate if the
surviving spouse had predeceased the decedent, to the extent that the
property is gratuitously derived from the decedent by any means
other than testate or intestate succession. 25 It is, of course, impossi-
ble to determine exactly what the decedent would have had in the
estate, if he had given nothing away during the marriage, and then
to allow the spouse one-third of that amount-less what the spouse
had been given by the decedent during his lifetime. The UPC ap-
proach is similar to this, but deliberately limited, carefully specifying
the nature of transfers that are to be considered as part of the aug-
mented estate. UPC § 2-207 provides that values included in the
augmented estate which pass or have passed to the surviving spouse,
or would have passed to the spouse but were renounced, are applied
first to the elective share. This necessarily reduces the amount that
other recipients must disgorge by way of contribution in order to
make up the full elective share.
Ohio law does not charge the separate property of the spouse
against the share that a surviving spouse may elect to take under the
law. The result is that a surviving spouse may freely upset the estate
plan by electing to take against the will, even though she has been
amply provided for by inter vivos transfers. Neither the legislature
nor the courts have expressed any sentiment in favor of a disinherited
spouse or in opposition to a greedy spouse.
(9) Effect of Election upon the Disappointed
The UPC requires recipients of assets constituting the aug-
mented estate to contribute equitably to make up the balance of the
elective share, unless the recipients take by reason of the renunciation
'2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1975 version).
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of the surviving spouse."' UPC § 2-207(b) requires the other recipi-
ents to contribute equitably in proportion to the value of their inter-
ests to the total value of the augmented estate not charged to the
surviving spouse. The use of the term "equitably apportioned" might
mean that factors of estoppel, waiver, or other equities may be con-
sidered in addition to mathematical proportions.
The UPC also protects, to a limited extent, persons who have
received nonprobate assets included in the augmented estate. Unlike
heirs or beneficiaries under a will, they would normally have no
reason to anticipate the spouse's election. Hence, they may choose
either to give up the property, or pay its value as of the time the
transfer became irrevocable, or at the decedent's death, whichever
occurred first. Only transferees from or appointees of the decedent
are liable, unless they have given the property away. If the property
has been given away, the donee of the decedent's transferee or ap-
pointee is liable for contribution if he still has the property or the
proceeds.2 5
Apparently, however, if the donees no longer have the property
or proceeds of the property, the original transferees or their appoint-
ees would have to make the contribution. This should not be too
harsh in application because the transferees should know, by reason
of the definition of augmented estate, that the transfer may be af-
fected by the death of the transferor.
The UPC specifically excludes the spouse's elective share from
the provisions of the will. 20 This is consistent with the UPC concept
that the surviving spouse's share is of an augmented and not a probate
estate, and would be implicit even if not expressed.
If the spouse elects to take against the will in Ohio, the balance
of the estate is distributed as though the spouse had predeceased the
testator.2 °7 Remainders are not accelerated, however, unless the will
makes a specific provision for acceleration. If provision has been
made for the spouse in the will, the court sequesters the gift to the
spouse and applies it to compensate disappointed beneficiaries. 218 If,
2 Recipients of renounced property are not required to contribute because the value of
the renounced property is charged against the elective share. Only property that is not charged
to the elective share is subject to be applied to making up any deficiency in the elective share.
Id., § 2-207(a).
I" d., § 2-207(c).
2 Id., § 3-902(a).
.. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page Supp. 1975).
Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 (1871); Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 570 (1895),
affd, 53 Ohio St. 679, 44 N.E. 1139 (1895).
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however, the spouse's share is sufficient to compensate the legatees
and the will has no residuary clause, his share under the will would
descend as intestate property.
If, as is normally the case, distributing the sequestered assets
does not compensate all the beneficiaries, Ohio appears to have
adopted a rule of equitable but not necessarily equal apportion-
ment. 29 However, it has also been held that specific legatees and
devisees are entitled to exoneration from the residuary estate, t 0 un-
less a contrary intention appears from the will. 21I The right of specific
beneficiaries to exoneration from the residuary estate creates an equi-
table lien on real estate, which may be enforced against purchasers
from the residuary distributees.2
It therefore appears that, although there is authority for the
application of equitable apportionment of the beneficiaries' disap-
pointment, Ohio would generally apply traditional rules of abatement
in the absence of a showing of the intent of the testator with respect
to an election to take against the will. The result is that the residuary
beneficiaries usually bear the full loss if the surviving spouse elects
to take against the will.
As previously discussed, an argument can be made that a spouse
who elects to take against the will may thereby become entitled to
take the entire interest of the decedent in the mansion house if the
value of the spouse's intestate share equals or exceeds the interest. If
so, the disappointed specific devisee of the mansion house would have
a very strong argument for exoneration. Not only would the surviving
spouse obviously be the preferred object of the testator's bounty, but
also her loss would be the result of a peculiar operation of the statute
under circumstances not within the contemplation of the legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Ohio has now adopted some UPC concepts, it has
"I In Blackford v. Vermillion, 107 Ohio App. 26, 156 N.E.2d 339 (1958), for example,
the testator had made a specific bequest of the proceeds of sale of a farm to six grandchildren
in equal shares. His residuary clause directed that the proceeds from the sale of the remainder
of his property be divided equally among his three children. The court held that the surviving
spouse took a one-third interest in both the farm and the remainder of the property. Accord,
ingly, the court directed that the grandchildren should bear the loss of one-third of the proceeds
of the farm. The residuary beneficiaries, in turn, lost one-third of their interest.
210 Dunlap v. McCloud, 84 Ohio St. 272, 95 N.E. 774 (1911).
211 Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N.E. 784 (1935).
2'2 Wyer v. King, 67 Ohio App. 321, 36 N.E.2d 897 (1940).
PROBATE CODE
rejected its proposals of flexible forms of probate procedure, ex-
panded powers of a personal representative, broad protection to bona
fide purchasers, elimination of bond and appraisal requirements,
state uniformity, and other such concepts. Above all, it has rejected
the concept that a decedent should not be permitted to dispose of
property by means that disinherit the surviving spouse. Ohio has,
however, adopted UPC provisions relating to advancements,2 1 3 debts
of a deceased heir,24 the prior right of the surviving spouse to a fixed
monetary amount,2 15 the barring of a convicted murderer from bene-
fitting by the murder, 21  the effect of a separation agreement on a
testator's will,217 the effect of a guardian's sale, condemnation, and
other events upon a disabled testator's will,218 and the effect of a
general residuary clause upon a power of an appointment. 219 It has
leaned toward the UPC in shortening the period of estate administra-
tion,22 1 in not requiring a surviving spouse who is the sole heir to give
an administrator's bond,2 in allowing a nonresident spouse or next
of kin to serve as executor, 22 in authorizing personal representatives
to make immediate distributions,22 and in expediting the sale of real
estate if all interested parties are adult and consent to the sale.24
Whether these Ohio changes will produce a sufficient reduction in the
costs and time necessary for administration to stem the tide of dissat-
isfaction with probate, only time will tell.
Interestingly enough, although the Ohio act does not appear to
213 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.051 (Page Supp. 1975).
214 Id., § 2105.052.
215 Id., § 2105.06.
216 Id., § 2105.19.
217 Id., § 2107.33.
21A Id., § 2107.501.
219 Id., § 2107.521.
21 Limitation periods are shortened throughout the act in accordance with two major time
changes. The first shortens the time for bringing a will contest from six months to four months
after admission of the will to probate. Id., § 2107.23. The second permits distributees to bring
an action to compel the executor or administrator to distribute assets within five, rather than
seven months, after his appointment. Id., § 2113.54
-, Id., § 2109.07.
-a Id., § 2113.05.
3 Id., § 2113.53. But note that neither she, the distributees, nor bona fide purchasers
from them are protected if the spouse does so.
-4 Id., § 2127.011. These slight tilts toward the UPC are offset somewhat by the repeal
of Ohio's self-proved will statute. 135 Laws of Ohio 120 (May 15, 1974, repealed 1976). It
apparently was repealed because of lack of knowledge of any reason for retaining it after
elimination, by the act, of the need for proof of wills by witnesses unless a party demands such
proof. Id. § 2107.14.
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be a prelude to full scale adoption of the UPC, one section of the act
may be used by some proponents of probate reform as a springboard
for free or do-it-yourself probate. That section2 2 mandates that every
probate court in the state shall use the blank form set forth in the
statute in procedures used to relieve an estate of less than $15,000
from administration. Some consumer advocates argue that anyone
can fill out the required form, without legal expertise, and that the
amount can easily be increased from $15,000 to $150,000, or any
other figure. They would amend the statute to make the journal entry
relieving the estate to operate as a conveyance upon which a bona fide
purchaser could rely not only for protection from the claims of credi-
tors, as provided in present law, but also from all other persons
interested in the decedent's estate. The purchaser could use a certified
copy of the entry and an instrument of conveyance from the person
shown by the entry to be entitled to the decedent's property as proof
of the purchaser's title. The certified copy of the entry and the instru-
ment of conveyance could be recorded if necessary to give construc-
tive notice of his ownership. 22
It has also been argued that a single administrative agency could
quickly do the work for the heirs-and that the procedures could be
data processed before the decedent died. Perhaps the day may come
when the decedent's computer program will be triggered by the pro-
cessing of his death certificate, and heirs, devisees, and taxing author-
ities will become the swift recipients of the decedent's bounty.
However, in their present form, the Ohio probate statutes ex-
press a clear policy that beneficiaries and creditors of a decedent
require the full protection of the probate court, unless the decedent
has made formal use of a will substitute. In the absence of objective
studies as to the necessity of such protection, and of a complete and
objective analysis of the effect of the UPC, or other proposed re-
forms, upon Ohio law, it is unlikely that the policy will be changed.
Id., § 2113.03(B). The section now requires the court to appoint a commissioner when
necessary for the execution of an instrument of conveyance. The UPC's provisions for small
estates less than $5,000 would permit transfer or delivery of certain personal property to
successors upon receipt of a successor's affidavit delivered after thirty days from the date of
death.
"I Protection of a bona fide purchaser from claims is the key to UPC simplification of
administration, A personal representative may, after his appointment, settle an estate without
further court action unless a party requests supervised administration or a formal proceeding.
Bona fide purchasers from the personal representative, or his distributees, take free from the
claims of creditors or other interested parties. The UPC proponents contend that, unless
requested by the parties, probate court protection is illusory, costs too much, and takes too
long. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-714 and 3-910 (1975 version).
